Naval War College Review
Volume 64
Number 3 Summer

Article 10

2011

Book Reviews
The U.S Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
War College, The U.S Naval (2011) "Book Reviews," Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 3 , Article 10.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/10

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

War College: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

THINK AGAIN: SECURITY ISSUES FOR A NEW CENTURY
Reveron, Derek S., and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris. Human Security in a Borderless World. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview, 2011. 255pp. $30

The authors, professors in professional
military education in the U.S. Navy
(Reveron) and the U.S. Air Force
(Mahoney-Norris), bring more than
sixty years of collective expertise as military officers and educators to their
subject—“human security,” which they
define as “a people-centered approach
focused on individual human beings
and their rights and needs.” The authors’ purpose is to transcend the traditional national-security model rooted
in the so-called realist school of international relations and offer a broader
construct that examines a continuum of
interrelated issue areas that affect individuals and groups in ways that cumulatively influence and shape regional
and international security.
The authors argue that transnational issues in the twenty-first century have
less to do with threats to territory than
with threats to people and more to do
with human development than with
state-on-state competition and conflict.
They aver that additional perspectives
on security are necessary to grapple
with contemporary challenges and
threats that are neither constrained by

nor dictated exclusively by states. They
begin their examination by assessing
global civic security, people’s physical
safety and integrity, noting that human
development is often hampered by oppressive governments, while in other
states it is impeded because weak governments cannot protect their people
from predation by nonstate actors
(criminal gangs, drug cartels, and
smugglers) increasingly empowered by
the tools of globalization. Importantly,
throughout their book Reveron and
Mahoney-Norris stake a position on
globalization midway between Thomas
Friedman’s optimism and Moisés
Naím’s pessimism.
The authors identify and discuss economic security, people’s capacity to
provide food and shelter for themselves
and their families, as a key component
of human security. They note how inequitable development and severe poverty
around the world imperil civic security
by making weak states more susceptible
to criminality, terrorism, and other
forms of extremism. As a part of this
discussion, Reveron and MahoneyNorris delve into issues related to
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sustainable development and the rising
role of women in human security. They
link civic and economic security to environmental security, pointing out how
climate change will have implications
for access to clean water and food, as
well as for stable health conditions and
ecosystem stability. The authors believe
that climate change will weaken already
feeble states and contribute to regional
and global insecurity in ways not seen
heretofore.
They offer a new focus on maritime security because new challenges and
threats could manifest themselves on
and below the world’s oceans. Fisheries
depletion and pollution could threaten
a vital food source for a growing world
population, while piracy and competing
claims for sea routes and seabed hydrocarbons could contribute to forms of
conflict not seen previously. Reveron
and Mahoney-Norris also highlight two
other areas often neglected by traditional security studies: health security
and cyber security. They illustrate how
in a more interconnected world infectious diseases carried inadvertently by
modern air and sea travel could have
deleterious effects on human security.
Cyber security receives attention because both state and nonstate actors
possess growing capabilities to disrupt
the global population’s increasing interconnectedness and mounting dependence on the virtual world.
This highly accessible book offers a
novel approach to security studies, including insightful inserts (“Think
Again”) to stimulate readers’ thinking
about security issues for a new century.
Human Security in a Borderless World
should prove invaluable to a wide audience ranging from civilian and military
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students to policy makers and those
who advise them.
CHARLES E. COSTANZO

Air Command and Staff College

Murphy, Martin N. Somalia, the New Barbary?
Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa. New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 2011. 176pp. $26.50

Within the sea services, allusion to the
Barbary pirates and the “shores of Tripoli” continues to resonate. Readers of
Martin Murphy’s detailed and thoughtful book Somalia may come away wishing that a solution to the situation our
mariners and fleet forces now face in
those inhospitable waters were as
straightforward as storming the
beaches.
Murphy’s previous works include Small
Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy
and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern
World (2009). He introduces the current volume with this caution: “The
purpose of this book is to examine
whether or not state failure is a useful
and accurate explanation of Somali piracy. . . . It will ask if there are links between Somali pirates and international
or regional terrorist groups. Even if
these links are tenuous, it will ask why
and how the terrorist groups that operate within Somalia might exploit the
maritime dimension in the future. Finally, it will review whether or not naval action, in the absence of political
engagement with entities within Somalia, will provide solutions to either
problem, and if, perversely, achieving
the political stability that may reduce or
eliminate piracy might provide violent
Islamist groups with the secure sanctuary within Somalia they are seeking.” In
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posing these questions Murphy takes
the story forward from that told in
Small Boats, which looked at maritime
crime worldwide. Although this work,
like his earlier book, finds no direct link
between terrorism and crime, despite
circumstances conducive to both, the
question remains how long the international maritime community can tolerate the effects of such an expensive
absence of the rule of law.
The current volume treats Somali piracy as it should be treated, sui generis.
Piracy as experienced today off Somalia,
and emanating from that nonstate, cannot be compared to contemporary experiences in the Gulf of Guinea or those
in the Strait of Malacca or among the
islands of the Indonesian archipelago.
As dangerous as those waters are, the
crimes they record are mostly of the
“smash and grab” variety, perpetrated
against ships in port, maneuvering
slowly in restricted waters, or at anchor.
Virtually all these crimes have occurred
in territorial waters and thus within local or national law-enforcement jurisdictions, rather than on the high seas, a
point that is critical to the legally actionable definition of the internationally recognized crime of piracy.
Many archipelagic and littoral states
lack the will or effective capacity to exercise their maritime sovereignty and to
combat crime uniformly throughout
their maritime territories. However,
only Somalia among today’s community of nations so lacks a sense of unitary statehood that pirate bands may
function as if they governed a ministate
within its borders. Yet these pirate
“strongholds” are virtual only, without
the centers of gravity that even a ministate would possess. In that sense, they
are not in reality the New Barbary but

something more ephemeral and even
more difficult to call to account.
How difficult is amply demonstrated in
Murphy’s detailed history of modern
Somalia and the forces that continue to
conspire to keep it ungoverned and, so
far, ungovernable. Somalia, the New
Barbary? not only takes us through the
history of Somalia’s failure to gel into
stable statehood but illustrates at each
turn how these continuing failures contributed to the ongoing pirate dramas
playing out in the waters off the Horn
of Africa.
There are few heroes in this story, and
the international community, insisting
on support for the minimally effective
Transitional Federal Government as its
sole interlocutor in combating piracy
and explaining away the lack of progress
despite huge sums spent on counterpiracy patrols and escort duties, bears a
large part of the burden. As Murphy
demonstrates, a large part of this inability on the part of the international community lies in the legitimate fear of
creating an even more intractable
problem should the extremists, currently characterized by the Islamist
al-Shabaab, form a governmental shield
behind which piracy could both thrive
and marry itself to extremism. However, as Murphy pointed out in Small
Boats and now refines in Somalia, these
fears have no basis in evidence. In fact,
there is ample evidence that the moneydriven pirates continue to hold political
influences of all stripes at arm’s length,
fearing restriction on their operations
and heavy taxation of their ill-gotten
gains.
Where the above has caused many observers to throw up their hands, resignedly calling down a plague on all their
houses, Murphy carefully outlines how
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Puntland, which is largely self-governing
and (by Somali standards) governed,
but which also hosts the vast majority
of pirate operations, could be a key either to combating piracy or to being
held accountable for not doing so.
However, either way, the international
community needs to extend tacit recognition to Puntland’s capabilities, if not
its sovereignty, in order to harness any
sense of responsibility to that international community.

CHARLES N. DRAGONETTE

The bigger challenge to the United
States and to its navy may come from
the appearance of a power vacuum that
continued Somali pirate success offers.
Many nations have joined the counterpiracy coalition off the Horn of Africa,
but as Murphy points out, not all forces
are equally effective, except perhaps in
demonstrating their nations’ right to be
there. As long ago as 1809 the Royal
Navy, operating with armed ships of the
Honourable East India Company, engaged pirates who were operating in the
Strait of Hormuz with the benign neglect of local rulers along the littoral.
After protracted combat, culminating
in the battle of Ras al-Khaimah, that left
the waters relatively safe, the Royal
Navy remained as the international
guarantor of the safety of trade, and
Britain enjoyed a century of military,
political, and economic preeminence.
Britain would not be the last to seek to
do so.

For the better part of the last ten years,
the word “terrorism,” in some shape or
form, has become an integral part of the
world’s vocabulary. Whether in regard
to military operations, air or sea transportation, law enforcement, cyber communications, or even the environment,
responses to perceived or actual threats
almost always include some form of
counterterrorist activity. With each response, various legal rights, and regimes
that society and individuals rely upon
and often take for granted, are time and
again directly impacted. Whether such
impacts are experienced as good or bad
depends in great part on one’s ability to
understand clearly the issues, which is
where Legal Issues in the Struggle against
Terror comes in.

Somalia, the New Barbary? thus takes
the reader beyond the breakers, which
may be all of Somalia that most analysts
of the current maritime scene have examined, and returns us to essential
questions on the water. It is an experience every reader with an interest in
matters that impel naval operations
ought to embrace.
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Senior Commercial Maritime Operations Analyst
Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center
(The views expressed here are purely the author’s
and do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S.
Navy or of the Office of Naval Intelligence.)

Moore, John Norton, and Robert F. Turner, eds.
Legal Issues in the Struggle against Terror. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic, 2010. 565pp. $70

This book of essays is essential reading
for anyone looking to understand the
many significant and complex issues regarding responses to terrorism since
9/11. The essays, written by legal experts and scholars, put into context, using words that are easy to read and
understand, some of the most hotly
contested international and domestic
legal issues. The editors state in the
preface that this work is an important
collection of essays that cover topics
considered integral to the “struggle
against al Qaeda and its terrorist allies.”
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However, the topics the editors chose to
cover in this book also include detailed
insight and analysis that transcends the
struggle with al-Qa‘ida and undoubtedly will be debated and revisited in
many venues for years to come.
While it is impractical to review in detail each individual author and chapter,
a brief synopsis of the discussions presented is essential for assessing this
book’s value within the scope of current
events. Detailed yet readable analyses of
the issues and challenges involving detainees and military commissions, U.S.
constitutional issues, national security
concerns, intelligence efforts, the law of
war, and civil-military relations provide
a broad overview of the legal concerns
and challenges the government faces
when confronting terrorists. A chapter
discussing civil liberties provides an integral counterbalance and reminds
readers of the human impacts that efforts to counter terrorism often create.
Collectively, these essays represent a
well reasoned and researched look into
the role of executive power and the
challenges that confronting terrorism
on a global scale presents to those
tasked with applying (or even developing) domestic and international law. To
their credit, the editors clearly note that
many of the issues addressed by the authors are “so new or so unsettled that
no one can draw bright legal lines with
great confidence.” If the book does not
offer any bright legal lines, it does help
focus readers on where those bright
lines might better fit within the various
issues discussed.
This book’s worth is reflected in the
quality of authors whom Moore and
Turner selected. Arguably, their diverse
and notable backgrounds make this
book a uniquely authoritative

compilation. From a law-school dean to
several law professors, as well as current
and former senior CIA, military, and
homeland-security legal professionals,
the authors are recognized and tested
experts within their areas of expertise.
Undoubtedly, John Norton Moore and
Robert F. Turner’s own extensive backgrounds and reputations in international law have enabled them to bring
together individuals who clearly were
up to the challenge. The reader is much
better off for the results.
Overall, Legal Issues in the Struggle
against Terror is an important work that
should be considered an integral resource for anyone interested in the legal, ethical, and moral issues that efforts
to counter terrorism raise in the twentyfirst century.
ERIC YOUNG

Naval War College

Coram, Robert. Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak,
U.S. Marine. New York: Little, Brown, 2010.
374pp. $27.99

Victor “Brute” Krulak is a legend within
the U.S. Marine Corps. That may be a
cliché, but it is true. This reviewer personally witnessed this phenomenon at
the Naval War College, in Newport,
Rhode Island, nearly four decades after
Krulak left the service. While delivering
a lecture at the College, I flashed a picture of Krulak on the screen. Instantly,
audience members began to call out
Krulak’s nickname—“Brute! Brute!”
The fact that Krulak’s son became
Commandant of the Corps only enhanced his reputation. The funny thing
about Krulak’s being so admired is that
he never held a major combat command
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as a general officer. He was brave, and
he won hero medals in World War II,
including the Navy Cross, but as a general during the Vietnam War he was in
Hawaii instead of in country. Flag and
general officers usually need to be combat leaders during a war to reach iconic
status.
As a result, this biography of Krulak by
Robert Coram is an all the more worthy
contribution to the historical literature
on the American military. Coram was
trained as a journalist and has written
two biographies of Air Force colonels,
John Boyd and Bud Day. This background proved important, because
Krulak had a powerful military intellect
and could think well on how to employ
military power in all three mediums,
air, land, and sea.
Coram makes a strength out of a weakness when he starts the biography off in
what seems a vague fashion. Krulak was
a brilliant self-promoter who often distorted the historical record to bolster
his reputation. This tendency included
lying about his early years growing up
in Wyoming. Born and raised a Jew,
Krulak decided sometime after his arrival at the U.S. Naval Academy that he
was an Episcopalian. He also hid the
fact that he had married as a teenager.
Although his deception regarding his
ethnic and religious identity could be
understood as a consequence of the bigotry of the time, it continued for the
rest of his life. One of his biggest claims
was for a wartime association with Lieutenant (junior grade) John F. Kennedy
—there was none. Krulak’s assignment
to the Kennedy White House had nothing to do with old ties of wartime
comradeship.
As Coram notes, what is important
about Krulak is his military career, not
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so much his personal character. With
that point made, Coram—in a testament to his skills as a reporter—does a
good job of letting the man’s personality come through. The biography grows
in strength as Krulak moves through his
career. In the days before World War II
he made major, truly important contributions to the development of amphibious warfare. After the war he helped
develop doctrine for the use of the helicopter. In the 1960s he turned his intellect toward counterinsurgency. The
section on counterinsurgency is the best
part of the book, though specialists will
want to see more than is there. Krulak
had good ideas that are still extremely
relevant. In all of this, Krulak was a
constant defender of the institutional
interests of the U.S. Marine Corps, including in the acrimonious debates on
military unification in the late 1940s.
In short, after reading this book it is
easy to see why Krulak is such an icon.
Marines and others will enjoy the read.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

Naval War College

Peattie, Mark, Edward Drea, and Hans van de
Ven, eds. The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–
1945. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2010.
614 pp. $65

The title of this book appropriately suggests a degree of ambiguity regarding
the actors fighting over the territorial
integrity and cultural identity of China.
The interplay of imperial Japan, Nationalist and Communist Chinese,
Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France,
and the United States from 1937 through
1945 creates a terrain challenging to
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navigate with historical accuracy and
objective truth. The conflicting viewpoints on these contentious events have
proved difficult, and perhaps impossible, material from which to develop a
definitive narrative. Consequently, the
editors have chosen to avoid illusions of
defining the “facts” of the matter, instead offering a number of exploratory
essays from opposing viewpoints. In
order to offer this multisource assessment, the editors coordinated the efforts
of scholars from China, Taiwan, Japan,
and the United States.
Editors Mark Peattie (a research fellow
at the Hoover Institution), Edward
Drea (former chief of the Research and
Analysis Division of the U.S. Army
Center of Military History), and Hans
van de Ven (a professor of modern Chinese history at Cambridge University)
stand apart as leading authorities on the
Pacific War. The other seventeen contributors range from unknown doctoral
candidates to heavyweight historians
like Ronald Spector. Despite the pitfalls
of bringing together authors of multiple
disciplinary backgrounds, varying languages, and competing cultures and
ideologies, the editors have maintained
a surprisingly well organized text,
firmly grounded in analysis of events
from the perspective of military affairs.
The book is organized in six parts: the
overview; opposing armies’ organization, training, and equipment; initial
hostilities (1937–38); a “stalemate in
strategies” (1938–42); the Burma and
Ichigo campaigns (1943–45); and conclusions. Each section begins with valuable information provided by the
editors, furnishing continuity between
thematic essays. The essays themselves
are insightful, if not groundbreaking,
offering milestones for future study and

debate. One innovative and striking
theme is the attention to and appreciation for the challenges facing Chiang
Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party, the
Kuomintang (KMT). While not excusing any failures, the authors make it
easy to understand the KMT’s weak position in an agrarian society with undeveloped state organization in the face of
a growing communist insurgency, tepid
allied support, and a vicious campaign
of destruction by an industrialized opponent. The deprivations endured and
the sacrifices made by the Chinese
through seven long years of the most
brutal warfare does much to explain the
KMT’s precarious situation at the war’s
end. At the end of the book, Ronald
Spector provides excellent context to
these essays on the Sino-Japanese War,
placing the scholarship within the
framework of the Pacific War, World
War II, and the history of warfare.
For military officers, I think, this book
provides a number of important insights. For one, it imparts valuable lessons regarding the success of and shortcomings in the Imperial Japanese Army.
At a tactical and operational level, the
Sino-Japanese War validates the Japanese emphasis on offensive tactics and
aggressive spirit to overcome numerical
superiority of opponents—a technique
proven successful in this case against
the Chinese rather than the Russians,
for whom the Japanese had prepared.
My only criticism of The Battle for
China derives from the inadequacy of
the maps. Those not intimate with Chinese, Japanese, and Burmese geography
will find places described difficult to locate. For instance, the prominent province of Chahar in Inner Mongolia finds
its name nowhere on the fourteen
maps, including that given for the battle
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of Pingxingguan Pass, which took place
in Chahar. The Burmese map shows
fewer than half the important locations
discussed and no indications of the
Burma Road, for which the forces were
fighting. The Japanese province of
_ _
Kyushu was certainly an important
place for recruiting, but one will have to
look elsewhere to find its location. The
political instability of the period exacerbates the situation in terms of geography. Many locations have Japanese,
Chinese, and European names. For instance, the Japanese refer to Tianjin,
near the city of Peking (modern-day
Beijing), as Tientsin. This situation is
compounded by the fact that provincial
boundaries and place-names of what
we now call China, especially in the
north, changed frequently in the midtwentieth century. Although the political and geographic landscapes of the
Sino-Japanese War admittedly pose a
challenge, the maps could have better
illustrated the events described.
As I am not certain that Chinese or Japanese audiences (those most interested
in this topic) will gravitate to this English work, The Battle for China must be
presumed to target a small niche market of Sino-Japanese War military history enthusiasts in North America and
Europe. To offset what may be limited
interest in its subject, I feel compelled
to praise in the strongest terms the efforts of Peattie, Drea, and Van de Ven
in organizing, editing, translating, and
publishing this important book. Without these distinguished professionals,
Western students of the Pacific War
would not have access to this important
Chinese and Japanese research, mediated by celebrated Western scholars.
The Battle for China is a rare treasure
that will likely renew interest in an
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underdeveloped field of Western scholarship. I highly recommend it to those
interested in the Pacific War or greater
insight into modern Chinese history.
MAJ. ROBERT BURRELL, U.S. MARINE CORPS

U.S. Special Operations Command

Mort, Terry. The Hemingway Patrols: Ernest
Hemingway and His Hunt for U-boats. New York:
Scribner’s, 2009. 272pp. $26

The Battle of the Atlantic has been
thoroughly researched and exhaustively
studied, especially by students attending
the Naval War College. However, rarely
has the epic campaign to defeat the
German U-boat menace been viewed
through the lens of the life and personality of one of America’s greatest literary figures. In The Hemingway Patrols,
Terry Mort offers a well researched account of this great campaign, one that
reads almost like an actual Hemingway
novel.
For students of military history, Mort’s
account of the titanic struggle between
the Allied navies and German U-boats
in the early months of 1942 will be
somewhat familiar. It is the juxtaposition with Hemingway’s decision to participate in the campaign that provides
the strength of this narrative. Mort depicts Hemingway in 1942 as at the zenith of both his life and his professional
career. Likewise, the German U-boat
campaign would reach its zenith during
this year: American shipping suffered
grievous losses at the hands of only a
dozen or so U-boats in the early months.
Why would Hemingway, living in luxury in Cuba at the time, risk everything,
with his drinking buddies, to hunt
U-boats in his wooden fishing trawl
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Pilar? Having studied at Princeton with
Hemingway biographer Carlos Baker,
Mort provides one of the most convincing explanations yet offered for Hemingway’s decision to place himself in
harm’s way.
It would be easy simply to ascribe Hemingway’s decision to that of a writer living out the life that he had illustrated in
his art. Mort takes a more scholarly approach, however. One of the most interesting elements of this book is its
description of the three stages through
which each of Hemingway’s characters
pass in his novels—the stage of innocence, then suffering, and finally an existential stage, in which the hero creates
meaning out of nothingness. It is certainly possible to see Hemingway himself following this trajectory. In the
imaginative mind of a writer, the
U-boat appeared as a multifaceted
menace, not only a threat to merchant
vessels but a stealthy craft that could
deliver spies to the many coves and inlets of Caribbean islands like Cuba.
Hunting down and attacking these
modern weapons of war would require
a dedicated band of ardent antifascists,
the likes of whom Hemingway had consorted with in Spain in the late thirties,
and whom he would lead into action
again, as his small fishing vessel sought
valiantly for the elusive U-boats
throughout the Caribbean and the Gulf
of Mexico. Many elements of Hemingway’s complex personality combined to
compel him to sail Pilar into action,
and Mort gives each of these factors due
treatment.
A former naval officer himself, Mort is
familiar with life at sea. The many accounts of Hemingway leading his crew
on these dangerous missions benefit
from Mort’s having participated in

patrols in some of the same waters. In
summing up this work, one phrase
stands above the rest as a testament to
the sweeping panorama of Mort’s ambitious attempt to tie together a great
naval campaign and the life of an
American literary giant: “It was action
and artistry combined. It was also fun,
most of the time, especially when there
was enough gin.” Mort has provided us
with a fascinating book, and students of
both military and literary history will
definitely want to put The Hemingway
Patrols on their reading list.
JEFF SHAW

Naval War College

Stoker, Donald. The Grand Design: Strategy and
the U.S. Civil War. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2010. 498pp. $27.95

It is difficult to imagine historical
ground that has been more thoroughly
mined than that of the American Civil
War. Biographies, battle studies, sweeping histories, and all manner of specialized analyses dot the literary landscape.
However, rather than turning away
from a potentially saturated market,
our collective interest in this sanguinary
conflict has kept publishers and authors
delivering a steady stream of material
year after year after year.
It is nonetheless a brave author who
claims to offer something truly original
to our understanding of the war. Although some scholars may quibble over
whether or not Stoker has succeeded in
this effort, his Grand Design, a onevolume history that examines the role
of strategy in the Civil War, is something of a rara avis. More to the point,
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it is both a useful and thoughtprovoking addition to any library.
Surprisingly, Stoker is at his weakest
when discussing just what he means by
strategy. The term is admittedly somewhat slippery, and competing definitions abound. In the end, Stoker settles,
by his own admission, for examining
the linkage of political policy objectives
and subsequent military operations.
As a result, the two most important
personages in the book are Abraham
Lincoln and Jefferson Davis. As political
leaders of their respective sides, it was
they who were responsible for setting
and approving political policy and objectives. Lincoln emerges as a political
leader who, having once determined the
political objectives of the United States,
was forced time and again to intervene
in the running of the war because his
generals failed to gain those objectives
through military operations. In doing
so, Lincoln gradually gained a distinct
appreciation for the military art and
sharpened his ability to see clearly
which courses of action would likely
produce successful results. Davis, in
contrast, saw himself as the Confederacy’s general in chief and would persist
in that notion to the detriment of the
Confederate war effort until 1865.
Stoker naturally examines the military
men on the other side of the politicalmilitary equation. Perhaps no one
should have expected strategically gifted
senior officers to be found in the ranks
of the U.S. officer corps in 1860, and
Stoker confirms that such men were
then lacking, with the possible exception of the aged Winfield Scott. The
U.S. Army was small, its garrisons were
small, and with the exception of the
brief war with Mexico, its units had always been small. The only big things
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about the Army were its theater of operations and the egos of some of its
more famous personalities. Yet individuals with a broader expanse of vision
did emerge. The best of these wore
Union blue, and Stoker makes a convincing argument that the best of the
best was Ulysses S. Grant, a man notable in his ability to complement the
president’s policies and objectives with
effective military operations. Stoker argues that Grant’s success was not just a
question of superior resources. Grant
saw beyond his theater of operations.
He understood the tools available to
him, and he worked in harness with his
political leader. William T. Sherman is
also given credit for being a general in
strategic alignment with national policy
and objectives. In contrast, however,
Stoker reasonably judges George B.
McClellan as a general with strategic insight and imagination but woefully incompetent when it came to battlefield
leadership, without which strategic objectives cannot be realized.
Stoker is far from being an unabashed
fan of the Union’s strategists; his biggest censure on its generals’ performance is that they were slow. He
convincingly claims that a Union victory was possible much earlier than the
spring of 1865; however, he does not regard that victory as inevitable. In contrast, he faults Confederate counterparts with never getting it right at all.
His criticisms of Jefferson Davis’s fixation on forward defense and the waste
of trying to preserve and protect the
Confederacy west of the Mississippi are
well argued indeed. Stoker gives credit
to Robert E. Lee for his capability to be
as good as Grant but notes that he was
nearly always confined to theater operations. General P. G. T. Beauregard, a
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self-proclaimed Southern strategist, is
simply and reasonably dismissed as a
fantasist.
Given the number of bad books that
have been written about the Civil War,
it is a pleasure to find a good one.
Stoker is a solid, competent author who
makes his points in clear convincing
prose. Written from a refreshing viewpoint, The Grand Design is a book
worth reading.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

McMeekin, Sean. The Berlin–Baghdad Express:
The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for
World Power, 1898–1918. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 2010. 496pp. $29.95

If ever there was a story of epic unintended consequences and “might have
beens,” Sean McMeekin’s The Berlin–
Baghdad Express is it. Approaching the
First World War in the Middle East
from the German and Ottoman perspectives, McMeekin expands our
Anglo-centric understanding of the
conflict. In doing so, he unveils a
breathtaking catalogue of misunderstandings, miscalculations, simple mistakes, and missed opportunities that
would be comic if not so horribly
tragic.
While the title conjures images of the
fabled Orient Express, the book is a
first-rate history of the diplomatic jockeying of the German and Ottoman Empires to gain advantage over their
respective archrivals, Britain and Russia. The railway would be a tool to enable Germany’s Drang nach Osten
(drive to the East) while strengthening
the Turks (bitter enemies of Germany’s

Russian rivals) by linking the farthest
reaches of the Ottoman Empire with
the seat of power in Istanbul. The completion of the railway, first to Baghdad
and then extended on to Basra, would
have profound political, economic, and
strategic importance.
To achieve this end Germany designed
a strategy to undermine the cohesion of
the British Empire through Islamic holy
war. That strategy was an outgrowth of
Kaiser Wilhelm II’s reckless and amateurish meddling in Oriental affairs.
The kaiser believed that his affinity for
Sultan Abdulhamid II, Caliph of the
Faithful, and for all things Islamic
would enable him to engineer a jihad
against the hated British, targeting the
empire’s large Muslim populations in
India, Egypt, and beyond. The kaiser, in
league with the sultan and later the
Young Turks, embarked on ambitious
propaganda and military campaigns designed to rally Muslims to the sultan’s
call for jihad, despite the facts that most
educated Muslims had long given up
the idea of the caliphate; that there was
no distinction in Islamic jurisprudence
or practice between a bad infidel (British, French) and good one (German,
Austrian, American, or maybe Italian);
that Sunni and Shia Muslims had vastly
different views of jihad; and that the
British had for years controlled access
to Mecca for the hajj. McMeekin also
points out the oddness of German
support for jihad juxtaposed with the
German-based Zionist movement,
which actually anticipated Britain’s
Balfour Declaration to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
The cast of characters includes soldiers,
statesmen, adventurers, charlatans, humanitarians, and thugs from across Europe, the Caucasus, Africa, and the
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Middle East. Many are familiar, such as
Kaiser Wilhelm, Abdulhamid II, and T.
E. Lawrence. Still more are rather obscure. Central among this group are
“Baron” Max von Oppenheim, a Jewish
scion of the famous banking family,
and Curt Prufer, a scholar assigned to
the German embassy in Cairo. Both
were Orientalists, both were devotees of
Kaiser Wilhelm, and both shared the
kaiser’s vision of jihad. Together they
worked to foment holy war from Libya
in the west through Egypt, Abyssinia,
Sudan, Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, and
India. After the war they emerged in the
forefront of Nazi anti-Semitism and the
atrocities that it produced.
A common theme found throughout
the narrative is that of miscalculation
born of ignorance or misunderstanding
of basic historical, cultural, political,
and religious truths. A prime example is
Germany’s tendency to see the Muslim
world as either for the Germans or
against them, while missing the vast
range of options in between, a problem
that persists in varying degrees today.
Another is the complexity of the region
that breeds such miscalculations.
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McMeekin’s treatment of the struggle
for control of Baku in August 1918 provides a brief but illuminating example
of just how complex that corner of the
world can be. With British, German,
Russian, Turkish, Armenian, Azeri, and
other factions vying for control of the
city (and its oil), fighting was not only
savage but included intramural attacks
upon allies. As we look at Afghanistan,
Pakistan, the Caucasus, and other tribal
regions today, we can see that the same
elements of complexity and confusion
that bedeviled earlier Western strategists is ours to deal with again, and
again.
Sean McMeekin is assistant professor of
international relations at Bilkent University, in Ankara, Turkey. His work is
based on German, Turkish, Austrian,
Russian, and American archives, as well
as secondary sources. It is carefully researched, well documented, and presented with a lively style that combines
analysis, insight, and a mix of irony and
wry humor that makes the book as
readable as it is informative.
COL. THOMAS E. SEAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED

Stafford, Virginia
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